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T-shirt Front: BE ASHAMED/ OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED
Back: HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27
- T-shirt worn by student Tyler Harper in Poway, California in 20052
T-shirt Front: ABORTION IS HOMICIDE
Back: YOU WILL NOT SILENCE MY MESSAGE/ YOU
WILL NOT MOCK MY GOD/ YOU WILL STOP KILLING
MY GENERATION/ ROCK FOR LIFE!
- T-shirt worn by student K.D. in Fillmore, New York
during 2003 and 20043

I. INTRODUCTION

The scene is hardly unusual in public schools: A student wears a T-shirt
with a provocative, religiously-based statement-perhaps one of those reprinted
immediately above-and finds him or herself referred to the principal's office
for possible disciplinary action.4 Moments later,5 a school administrator must
2

This was the T-shirt speech at issue in Harper v. Poway Unified School District, 445 F.3d

1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to
dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
3
This was the T-shirt speech at issue in K.D. v. Fillmore Central School District, 2005 WL
2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005). T-shirt available online at http://americanlifeleague.stores.
yahoo.net/abishom.html (last visited July 19, 2007). This T-shirt also was worn by a student
enrolled in a school district I represented while in practice. I was involved in assessing the district's options for responding to the T-shirt. I do not know what action the district took, if any,
and to the best of my knowledge the situation did not lead to litigation.
4
For media accounts of such conflicts, see, e.g., Candace Taylor, Student Opposition to Civil
Unions Disrupts SWHS,
JOURNAL
INQUIRER,
Apr.
16, 2005,
available at
http://www.joumalinquirer.com (archives) (high school students were told they could not wear Tshirts with Biblical speech about homosexuality because it was "hate speech"); Asher Abrams,
Know Your Rights: Clothing a Form of Free Speech? THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Apr. 27,
2007, at E-3 (student told she could not wear a "rock concert T-shirt with the words 'Jesus Freak'
written on the front and a bible verse on the back"); Melissa Jenco, Free speech, student safety at
heart of suit, CHICAGO DAILY HERALD, Mar. 23, 2007, at 5 (two high school students sued their
school district after they were told they could not wear anti-gay T-shirts); Charles Haynes, Both
sides must show respect in gay student debate, THE TENNESSEAN, July 14, 2006, at 17A (A week
after Harperv. Poway was decided in the Ninth Circuit, 13 students were suspended from a Sacramento-area school for wearing T-shirts declaring: "Homosexuality is sin. Jesus can set you free"
and around the same time, other schools in the region sent students home for wearing T-shirts
with similar statements); Jennifer Skalka, T-shirt campaigns divide school; Students stand up for
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answer a question that appears deceptively simple: By wearing this T-shirt to
school, has the student done something that merits punishment? The teachers
and administrators who encounter these situations often are frustrated by this
question6--and understandably so, because lower courts' decisions reveal a significant lack of clarity in the law.7
their beliefs, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 20, 2005, at 3 (students were permitted to wear T-shirts
saying "gay? fine by me" but not T-shirts saying "Crimes committed against God" on the front
and "discrimination against ... my 10 Commandments, my prayers, my values, my faith, my
God" because the latter T-shirts apparently were not approved by the school under the materials
distribution policy before they were handed out) (another student created his own T-shirt saying
"It's not OK to be gay"; the side of the T-shirt had a rainbow with a slash through it); Mike
Hoyem, Student awaits anti-abortionpamphlet ruling, THE NEWS-PRESS, Apr. 13, 2004, at 1B
(student wants to wear a T-shirt showing graves beneath the words "45 Million Abortions Since
1973"); Shamus McGillicuddy, Antiwar 'Jesus'shirt OK'd to wear in school; Donning it violates
no rule, principaldecides, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Mar. 12, 2003, at I (student eventually allowed
to wear a T-shirt saying "Who would Jesus bomb?" after being briefly detained by the school
administration while they consulted district counsel).
5
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (acknowledging that administrators make
these decisions "to act-or not to act-on the spot").
6
Id. at 2639 (Breyer, S., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Teachers are neither
lawyers nor police officers; and the law should not demand that they fully understand the intricacies of our First Amendment jurisprudence."); see generally Curry ex rel. Curry v. Sch. Dist. Of
the City of Saginaw, 452 F.Supp.2d 723, 733-34 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (see the court's discussion
granting the teacher qualified immunity); Andrew Trotter, Consensus is Sought on Religion in
Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 14, 2007, at 5 ("'[S]chool boards are getting a lot of bad advice' on
handling religious issues, and many administrators fear that their attempts to resolve these issues
may backfire and inflame latent conflicts.").
7
The Brief for Petitioner Deborah Morse in Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, n. 15 (2007),
chronicled comments from various courts regarding student free speech cases:
See, e.g., Harperv. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1193 & n. 1 (9th
Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Reconciling Tinker and Fraser is no
easy task"; acknowledging that, at the time of the incident in Frederick, the
parameters of "plainly offensive" speech under Fraserwere still in flux), cert.
granted,judgment vacated, case remanded, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Hosty v.
Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that many aspects of
student speech law "are difficult to understand and apply"); Denno v. Sch. Bd.
of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11 th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he fact that the
district court judge found the legal landscape so unclear as to include the alternative Fraserholding discussed above remains strong evidence that the law
was not clearly established that Tinker prohibited individual defendants' actions, as opposed to the more flexible reasonableness or balancing standard of
Fraserpermitting them."); McIntyre, 804 F. Supp. at 1426 (describing Fraser
as "oblique at best and certainly less than clear"); see also Cindy Lavorato &
John Saunders, Public High School Students, T-shirts, and Free Speech: Untangling the Knots, 209 ED. LAW. REP. 1, 1 (2006) ("As a result of the numerous applications of Fraser, the extent of students' free speech in public
schools is more than a bit tangled."); Justin T. Peterson, Comment, School Authority v. Students' First Amendment Rights: Is Subjectivity Strangling the
Free Mind at Its Source?, 3 MICH. ST. L. REv. 931, 932-33 (2005) (examining
the "confusion surrounding existing Supreme Court precedent" and asserting
that "neither students nor school officials understand what students' free
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To begin with, perhaps contrary to common assumptions, the Free
Speech Clause, not the Free Exercise Clause, often does the so-called "heavy
lifting" work of protecting individuals' religious liberty interests! Yet, the de
facto substitution of the Free Speech Clause for religion clauses doctrine in
many of these situations hardly has been one without problems. 9 Furthermore,
as often happens, free speech doctrine in the elementary and secondary public
school context differs from free speech doctrine generally ° and accordingly
presents its own set of unresolved questions.
speech rights are in the school environment"); Douglas W. Kmiec et al., Individual Rights and the American Constitution 574 (2004) ("[B]alanc[ing] the
students' need to exercise their First Amendment rights with the school authorities' needs to maintain order to carry out their educational tasks... is one
of the murkier areas of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment
Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REv.
527, 542 (2000) ("There are literally dozens of lower federal court cases over
the last thirty years dealing with student speech. They follow no consistent
pattern; some are quite speech-protective and follow Tinker's philosophy as
well as its holding, while others are very restrictive of student speech and treat
Tinker as if it has been overruled.").
8
See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The FreeExercise Clause: How Redundant, and Why?, 33 Loy.
U. Cm. L.J. 95 (2001); Steven G. Gey, When is Religious Speech Not "Free Speech"?, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REv. 379 (2000); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup.
CT. REv. 1 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LoY. U. CH. L.J. 71
(2001).
9
See, e.g., Gilbert A. Holmes, Student Religious Expression in School: Is It Religion or
Speech, and Does it Matter, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 377, 381 (1994) ("Relying on free speech principles to protect student religious expression is ...unsatisfactory and unacceptable.")
10
1 often tell my education law students that examining constitutional law in K-12 public
schools is a bit like looking at one's self in a fun house mirror-although the basic image (or
constitutional principle) is the same, we do not have to look very closely to see some significant
variations from the image we would expect to be reflected back-this part is taller, that one is
wider, something else is barely there. These variations occur because the Court has been responsive to the knowledge that the primary constitutional rights-holders in schools, the students, are
more vulnerable not only because of their young age. For example, school-led prayer is not permitted in schools, but state legislatures may open with prayer; the Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), coercion principle is absent from cases where the subjects are adults; search and seizure
requirements are much more lenient inside schools than elsewhere. See generally James E. Ryan,
The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1388 (2000) (individuals' constitutional rights also vary more frequently in prison and military contexts). Additionally, courts have
recognized that students are a captive audience due to compulsory school attendance statutes in
place across the nation. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, Table 3.11 Compulsory School Attendance Laws and Exemptions, By State: 2005 (2006), available at:
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/statereformrestabl .asp (all 50 states and the District of Columbia
have compulsory attendance laws).
1
At oral argument in Morse v. Frederick,the following colloquy occurred:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think the law was so clearly established
when this happened that the principal, that the instant the banner was unfurled,
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The student religious T-shirt speech situations help to isolate one of
those questions. What speech rights does a student retain if his or her individual' 2 religious speech is substantially and materially disruptive of the educational process (or reasonably anticipated to have this effect)-perhaps more
disruptive than speech from other religious or non-religious viewpoints? The
situation giving rise to Harper v. Poway Unified School District,' nearly presnowballs are flying around, the torch is coming, should have said oh, I remember under Tinker I can only take the sign down if it's disruptive. But
then under Fraser I can do something if it interferes with the basic mission,
and under Kuhlmeier I've got this other thing. So she should have known at
that point that she could not take the banner down, and it was so clear that she
should have to pay out of her own pocket because of it.
MR. MERTZ [attorney for Frederick]: Mr. Chief Justice, there are two different time points we have to talk about. There's the heat of the moment out
there on the street, but then later back in the office when she actually decided
to levy the punishment after she had talked to him, after she heard why he did
it and why he didn't do it, after she had had a chance to consult with the
school district's counsel. At that point in the calmness of her office, then she
should indeed have known it. And she did testify that she had taken a master's degree course in school law in which she studied Kuhlmeier and Fraser
and Tinker. SoCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And so it should be perfectly clear to her exactly what she could and couldn't do.
MR. MERTZ: Yes.
JUSTICE SCALIA: As it is to us, right? (Laughter.)
JUSTICE SOUTER: I mean, we have a debate here for going on 50 minutes
about what Tinker means, about the proper characterization of the behavior,
the nonspeech behavior. The school's terms in dealing with the kids that
morning. The meaning of that statement. We've been debating this in this
courtroom for going on an hour, and it seems to me however you come out,
there is reasonable debate. Should the teacher have known, even in the, in the
calm deliberative atmosphere of the school later, what the correct answer is?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-49, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), available at
http:llwww.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06-278.pdf.
The parties' briefs in Morse v. Frederick elaborate this doctrinal debate. Compare Brief for
Petitioner 13-14, 20-21, 25-30, availableat: http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/
06-07/06-278_Petitioner.pdf with Brief for Respondent 10-12, 17-21, available at: http://www.
abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/06-07/06-278_Respondent.pdf. See also the discussion
about this issue throughout comments responding to Professor Eugene Volokh's post about the
Morse v. Frederick case, at http://volokh.com/posts/1 145577196.shtml (Apr. 20, 2006).
12 See Kathleen Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, passim, 1211 (2002) (challenging the doctrinal private speechpublic speech dichotomy dividing students' speech and arguing for greater student speech rights,
yet conceding that "[tihe public characteristics of this speech mean that schools should have some
authority to ensure that the speech is appropriate to the occasion, civil and respectful of the
speaker's audience, and consistent with the school's pedagogical objectives").
13
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,judgment
vacated, case remanded with instructionsto dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
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sented this very issue. The Supreme Court declined to hear Harper during its
2006 term, and the Ninth Circuit had decided the case on slightly different
grounds.' 4 Also during the 2006 term, though, the Supreme Court decided an5
other case involving student speech, Morse v. Frederick.1
The student speech
in Morse was not religious: it consisted of a 14-foot paper banner on which
crude block-letters apparently constructed from duct tape spelled out "BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS," a statement its student-author admits was intended to be nonsensical. 6 Because Morse is so self-limiting, it does not clarify much in the
maze of student speech law-but it also does not close off the possibility that
Supreme Court case law implicitly permits some viewpoint discrimination
against religious and nonreligious speech in the public elementary and secondary school context.
Accordingly, the next section briefly reviews the limited application of
Free Exercise Clause in the context of student religious T-shirt speech. The
following section then turns to the Free Speech Clause and analyzes the doctrinal background for Morse as well as Morse itself, with particular attention to
how Supreme Court cases arising out of the public elementary and secondary
school setting have engaged or avoided the issue of viewpoint discrimination.
Contrary to the often-held assumption and the conclusions of some circuits, I
argue that the Court's four student speech cases can be read together as a body
of law that permits schools to engage in limited viewpoint discrimination, although the exact contours of this exception remain unclear. 7
14

Id. The Ninth Circuit's opinion focused on Tinker's rights of others prong, to the extent it

considered Harper's free speech rights.
This was certainly not the first time the Court passed up an opportunity to clarify the applicability of the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses in public elementary and
secondary schools. See, e.g., Fleming v. Jefferson, 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1110 (2003).
15
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
16
Id. at 2618; Mark Walsh, Rights at Stake in Free-Speech Case, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 14, 2007,
at 1.
17
In this article, I do not resolve the limits of such an exception although I assume infra at
note 69 that such an exception does not permit intentional viewpoint discrimination in the absence
of a constitutionally permissible reason for restricting the speech. In part, I reach this assumption
because that is all my argument requires. Furthermore, what could be characterized as purposeful
viewpoint discrimination is not always invidious-a school that advocates tolerance of differences
based on race, sex, sexual orientation, etc., seems on different footing than one quashing all
speech in support of Republican political candidates and Republican-supported ballot initiatives,
for example. Furthermore, the analysis of government purpose and constitutional implications of
various purposes are complicated questions beyond the scope of this article. See generally Kristi
L. Bowman, Seeing Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer'sEyes: The EvolutionIntelligent Design Debates, 29 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 417 (2006) (examining the government
purpose issue in the Establishment Clause context). John Taylor, who has authored a thoughtful
companion piece to this one, Why Student Religious Speech is Speech, 110 W.VA. L. REv. 223
(2007), examines this issue in detail in Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination (Nov. 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss1/12

6

Bowman: Public School Students' Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimina

2007)

RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION

II. STUDENTS' RELIGIOUS SPEECH AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

Analyzing an individual student's religious speech-such as the messages on the T-shirts with which this article began-involves consideration not
only of the Free Exercise Clause, but also of the Free Speech Clause. And,
when the site of the constitutional conflict is a public elementary or secondary
school and the rights-holders are schoolchildren, the contours of constitutional
law sometimes vary significantly from the general constitutional rules. 18 This
section discusses an area in which the doctrine does not vary: the Free Exercise
Clause. The following section will turn to an area in which the variation is substantial and in which the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination is not entirely clear: the Free Speech Clause. (Because it is significantly less likely that
the Establishment Clause will come into play in student T-shirt religious speech
cases, this article will not engage potential Establishment Clause issues in detail.' 9)
Almost twenty years ago, the Court issued its noteworthy decision in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,2°
holding that if an individual identifies a law or governmental rule that conflicts
with his or her religious belief or practice, the regulating governmental body is
18

19

See supra note 10.
See, e.g., Harper,445 F.3d at 1190-91 (rejecting Harper's Establishment Clause claim un-

der the Lemon test and also under a coercion analysis).
A potential Establishment Clause claim in this context could be brought by a third-party
student: by permitting one student to wear a T-shirt with a particular religiously-based message,
the school endorses that T-shirt, and thus the student's private action is transformed into unconstitutional state action. The likelihood of success of this argument is low, primarily because Supreme Court and lower court cases have addressed reasonable third-party students' ability to differentiate between the speech of a private actor (whether student, teacher, student organization, or
community organization) and the speech of the school. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 274-78 (1981); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
("The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.");
Id at 227. ("High school students are mature enough to and are likely to understand that a school
does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis.");
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001) ("[W]e have never extended our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private religious conduct during nonschool hours
merely because it takes place on school premises where elementary school children may be present."); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) ("The
showing of this film series would not have been during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members. The
District property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these
circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that the community would
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or
to the Church would have been no more than incidental."). The argument becomes marginally
stronger if an ill-defined critical mass of students are all wearing the same shirt; stronger if the Tshirt has the school name and a slogan that the school could reasonably appear to have approved;
and perhaps strongest yet when the "speech" involves an exception to the school rules, such as the
Day of Silence.
20
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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not required to grant any exemption if the law or rule is one of general applicability.2 1 Furthermore, the government may not specifically target religion or
religious practice.22 If a free exercise claim is presented in concert with another
constitutional claim,2 3 courts should view the duo as a "hybrid rights" claim and
ensure that the government's refusal to accommodate the individual's religious
belief or practice can survive strict scrutiny. 24 When the hybrid framework is
triggered, as it necessarily will be in student religious speech cases, 25 the test
applicable to an individual's free exercise claim changes in such a way that the
student's claim has a better (though perhaps still only slim) chance of succeeding, as compared to a non-hybrid "pure" free exercise claim.26
Several scholars who have written about Smith argue that despite the
substantial changes Smith made to the face of free exercise doctrine, Smith had a
comparatively small impact on the actual results of free exercise cases because

21

22
23

See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 8, at 96; Tushnet, supra note 8, at 71.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
The Free Exercise claim can be linked to one of many other rights but appears to be most

often connected to a parent's liberty interest in directing the upbringing of his child, a child's free
speech claim. William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise
Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 238 (1998); Marie Elise
Lasso, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 569, 596-97 (1993).
24
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2
Smith was a criminal case, but courts generally agree that it applies in both the civil and
criminal contexts-and thus it applies to Free Exercise claims arising out of situations implicating
public schools. Jeremy Meyer, Ratchet Plus? Possible Constitutional Foundationsfor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343, 351 n.51

(1995) (collecting cases). Religious speech claims could be at the very least a combination of
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clause claims. As in Harper, a claim also could involve allegations of the violation of the Establishment Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, and various state law claims.
26
See generally, Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484
(2007). At least fifteen states have stronger free exercise standards through state legislative or
judicial determinations. Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public
Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MIcH.
L.REv. 2209, 2213-14 nn.31-32 (2005) (collecting twelve such state statutory citations and three
such case citations).
Circuits are split on the issue of the necessary strength of the two independent components
of hybrid claims. The Second and Sixth Circuits seem to disregard the hybrid rights doctrine. The
First and D.C. Circuits recognize hybrid claims only if both are independently viable, while the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits will recognize hybrid claims if both component claims are colorable.
Ryan M. Akers, Note, Begging the High Court for Clarification: Hybrid Rights Under Employment Division v. Smith, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 77 (2004) (collecting case citations); Michael E.
Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid
Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L.REv. 2209, 2221-34 (2005) (collecting case citations).
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the doctrine already was weak and/or inconsistently applied.27 Detractors and
defenders of Smith alike have criticized its reasoning as well as its result, agreeing that Smith further limited the ability of the Free Exercise Clause to protect
religious exercise and speech. 28 One scholar's unforgiving description is representative of many others', characterizing the Free Exercise Clause as "virtually
meaningless both within and outside of schools., 29 The four student religious
27

See, e.g.,

CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE

CONSTITUTION, 44-45 (Harv. Univ. Press 2007) ("In 1990 five justices surveyed this string of

precedents and [in Smith] stated the obvious-that although the Court had long given lip service
to Sherbert's compelling state interest test, it had never applied it faithfully and, what is more,
could not possibly do so."); William P. Marshall, What is the Matter with Equality? An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence,75
IND. L.J. 193,195-96 (2000) ("[N]obody argues that Smith signaled a major change in the results
of free exercise cases. Sherbert's compelling interest test had never been given much vitality by
the Court, and its doctrinal abandonment in Smith simply echoed the actual results in cases" (citing Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problems and Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944 (1989))). However, one social science article concluded that
"[t]he odds of a favorable decision for religious freedom cases were approximately two to one for
those periods separated from Smith." That study measured outcomes during three timeframes:
January 1981-April 1990 before Smith, April 1990-December 1993, and then December 1993January 1997 under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. John Wybraniec & Roger
Finke, Religious Regulation and the Courts: The Judiciary'sChanging Role in ProtectingMinority Religionsfrom MajoritarianRule, 40 J.FOR SCI. STUDY OF RELIG. 427, 438 (2001).
28
As part of an article in which he asked whether the Free Exercise Clause after Smith was
entirely (or just almost entirely) redundant, Professor Mark Tushnet noted that, "the present scope
of the Free Exercise Clause ...is quite small." Tushnet, supra note 8, at 72. For further comments on this point, see, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Free Exercise Clause: How Redundant, and
Why?, 33 Loy. U. CHI.L.J. 95, 112, 115 (2001) ("In the context of speech and expressive association, the Free Speech Clause may play a more affirmative role in fostering constitutional protection for religion. In particular, it appears that religion is accorded a preferred status in the Court's
free speech doctrine, and the same may be true for expressive association") (The Free Exercise
Clause is independent of the Free Speech Clause in that it "may provide at least a small amount of
non-redundant constitutional shelter for the institutional autonomy of religious organizations.").
See also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLUME 1: FREE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS, 76-85 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 925, 929 (2000) (After Smith, the Free Exercise Clause no longer retains an independent function when compared to the other First Amendment clauses.); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990);
Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993
BYU L. REV. 259, 260-61, n.9 (collecting a sample of such criticism in the two years following
the Smith decision); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743
(1992).
Soon after Smith, George Dent summarized the results of Free Exercise controversies as
follows: "When accommodation is denied, some parents sue. Reported opinions in these cases are
few and the results are inconsistent. Parents usually (though not always) win an exemption from
offensive instruction, but rarely gain any further relief." George W. Dent, Of God and Caesar:
The Free Exercise Rights of Public School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 707 (1993).
29
Ryan, supra note 10, at 1388. See articles cited supra note 28. Steven W. Fitschen, President of the National Legal Foundation and an Instructor at Regent University School of Law, has
explained the reasoning and intentionality of reframing free exercise cases as free speech cases
and, retrospectively, how this was a mistake for conservative advocates of religious liberty princi-
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T-shirt cases decided by federal courts seem consistent with this evaluation: in
two, the student tried to bring a free exercise claim and failed, 30 and in two the
student did not even raise a free exercise claim.3 1 This is not to suggest that
these students should have prevailed under the Free Exercise Clause,32 but rather
to illustrate that religious speech claims have more potential for success under
the Free Speech Clause (which applies the same rules to religious and nonreligious speech).33
As mentioned previously, the Supreme Court has not employed a distinct free exercise standard for students' religious exercise and speech in public
elementary and secondary schools and there is little reason to think it would do
pies. Steven W. Fitschen, Religion in the Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Time for a New Strategy, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 433, 435-44 (2001).
Interestingly, many legal scholars in other countries view the Establishment Clause as the
"useless" one of the Religion Clauses because of its extensive doctrinal discord. Many other
countries' constitutions and international treaties do not have a parallel to our Establishment
Clause, although nearly all have a Free Speech Clause. Often, it is assumed that a free exercisetype clause can do the work of the United States' Free Exercise Clause as well as its Establishment Clause. Kent Greenawalt, Moral and Religious Convictions as Categories for Special
Treatment: The Exemption Strategy, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1605, 1633 (2007); Mark ModakTuran, Reenchanting InternationalLaw, 22 Miss. C. L. REv. 263, 291 (2003).
30 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S.Ct. 1484 (2007);
Zamecnik ex rel. Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
17, 2007). This article assumes that the district courts applied the law properly and does not contend that the students should have been able to prevail under current law.
31
Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 969 (S.D. Ohio 2005); K.D.
v. Fillmore Central School Dist., 2005 WL 2175166 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6,2005).
It appears that the small universe of recent, post-Smith student religious speech cases may
include not-insignificant variations of the free exercise test. For example, in two religious jewelry/appearance cases where students' religious speech ultimately was protected, the court did not
engage in a particularly exacting free exercise analysis or employ a standard that demanded much
of the student. See, e.g., Alabama and Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trustees of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (E.D. Tex. 1993); Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch.
Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997). In contrast, courts applied Free Exercise tests that demanded more of the students (and thus were more consistent with Smith) in two situations where
students' religious speech ultimately was unprotected under the Free Exercise Clause (one of
these was a T-shirt case, the other involved a student's attempts to have her religious viewpoint
represented on a panel about homosexuality during Diversity Week). Harper,445 F.3d at 1188;
Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780, 808-09 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Perhaps the
students in Harper, Nixon, K.D. and Zamecnik might have prevailed on a Free Exercise claim
under some of these tests. See also Professor Taylor's discussion of these cases, supra note 17, at
n.4.
32
In the companion piece to this article, Professor John Taylor argues convincingly that the
dominance of the Free Speech Clause to the exclusion of the Free Exercise Clause in what would
otherwise be characterized as hybrid-rights situations is "a matter of constitutional principle."
Taylor, supra note 17, at 224.
33
See generally William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With Equality?: An Assessment of
the Equal Treatment of Religion and Non-religion in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence,75 IND. L.J.
193 (2000).
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The Court's two notable cases involving free exercise rights arising out of
the public elementary and secondary school setting both are consistent with
Smith. The first, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, decided in
1943 without use of a clear test, is often characterized as a free speech case,
although it presents what would likely now be characterized as a hybrid free
speech/free exercise claim and thus today would receive the same heightened
level of scrutiny as in the original decision.35 The second, Yoder,3 6 decided in
1972, is consistent with Smith because the Court
37 took pains to explicitly accommodate its holding in Smith, at least facially.
Thus, it is the Free Speech Clause that is the focus of this article about
students' religious speech, and to which we now turn.
SO.

III. THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
IN SCHOOLS

[T]he Court in Tinker held that a school may prohibit student
speech, even if the consequence is viewpoint discrimination, if
the speech violates the rights of other students or is materially
disruptive.
- Ninth Circuit, 200638
[T]here is no indication [in Hazelwood, decided 19 years after
Tinker] that the Court intended to drastically rewrite First
Amendment law to allow a school official to discriminate based
on a speaker's views.
- Eleventh Circuit, 198939
Free speech decisions arising out of the public school context have been
responsive to the purposes of public education-curricular instruction, civic
preparation, and socialization-and also to the practical constraints of the educational setting. 40 Because of this, the three core student speech cases before
Morse-Tinker,41 Fraser,42 and Hazelwood' 3-are, in Professor James Ryan's
34

The factors considered as part of the free exercise analysis (e.g., what constitutes a compelling governmental interest?) may differ somewhat when applied to public schoolchildren as opposed to adults, or to a non-educational environment. Ryan, supra note 10, at 1388.
35
Compare Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) with Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of

Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). See also Ryan, supra note 10.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

36

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82; see also Ryan, supra note 10.
Harper,445 F.3d at 1184 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 511 (1969)).
39
Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (1 th Cir. 1989).
40
See supra note 10.
41
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
37

38
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words, "more deferential to school authorities than . . . standards that apply in
44 As the circuit split4 5 illusother contexts and to other government officials."

trated by the excerpts immediately above reveals, none of the Court's now-four
student speech cases make clear whether such deference also tacitly permits
school officials to discriminate among students' expressed individual view-6
points in public elementary and secondary schools during the school day.
Thus, the default assumption often has been that the Court's facially unequivocal statements generally prohibiting viewpoint discrimination in other contexts
applied to student speech.4 7 Yet, this assumption does not square with the
Court's departures from generally-applicable free speech doctrine in the unique
context of public elementary and secondary schools.4 8
Accordingly, this section first briefly describes the factual and doctrinal
importance of focusing on students' religious T-shirt speech. Next, it examines
the Court's three foundational student speech cases, arguing that even though
they do not address the issue of viewpoint discrimination directly, these cases
have implications for the permissibility of viewpoint discrimination in the student T-shirt speech situations. Then, it turns to two of the Court's overt viewpoint discrimination cases occurring in limited public fora and ultimately to
Morse.
42

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Ryan, supra note 10, at 1359.
45
See cases and discussion cited infra note 110. See generally Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood's Core: A New Approach to Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, FLA. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2008).
46
See infra Sections III.B. and III.D; see also Waldman, supra note 45,
47
See, e.g., Jay Alan Sekulow et a]., ProposedGuidelinesfor Student Religious Speech and
Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REv. 1017, 1037-38 (1995); Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discriminationin Public Schools, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 647, 648, passim
(2005); Harper, 445 F.3d at 1201 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("I have considerable difficulty with
giving school authorities the power to decide that only one side of a controversial topic may be
discussed in the school environment because the opposing point of view is too extreme or demeaning. As Judge Gilman said in his dissent in Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220
F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000), '[S]chool officials are not free to decide that only one side of a topic is
open for discussion because the other side is too repugnant or demoralizing to listen to.' Id. at 474
(Gilman, J., dissenting) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508). I couldn't have said it better."); Peck v.
Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 632 n.9 (2d Cir. 2005); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d
1314, 1319, 1325 (1lth Cir. 1989); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th
Cir. 2000); Kincaid v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 1999).
48
Ryan, supra note 10, at 1359. "For one set of rights, involving the Free Speech Clause, Due
Process Clause, and Fourth Amendment, the Court is willing to defer to education officials, with
the caveat that the policies that intrude upon these rights without furthering an academic goal will
not be tolerated. For the second set of rights, involving Equal Protection, Establishment, and Free
Exercise Clauses, the Court is unwilling to defer to education officials, with the caveat that policies that intrude upon these rights in order to further an academic goal may well be tolerated.
With regard to each set of rights, however, the dispositive question-does the challenged policy
advance an academic goal-appears to remain the same." Id. at 1417.
43
44
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How T-shirt Speech Differsfrom Other Speech

Among student religious speech situations (student prayer, distribution
of materials, religious jewelry, student organization recognition and use of
school facilities, et cetera) the T-shirt speech situations are uniquely focused:
this type of speech has a specific message; 49 it is the students' speech and not
their parents' ;50 the speech occurs during the school day on school premises and
in what I will assume is a closed forum; 5' it is speech of an individual nature
with a low likelihood of being perceived as the speech of the school; 52 it is not
The speech in Tinker conveyed a specific message: I oppose the war in Vietnam. The messages conveyed on the T-shirts also are specific: "Homosexuality is a sin," "Islam is a lie," etc.
This is in contrast to the message conveyed by religious jewelry, which, if intended to convey any
message, loosely affiliates the wearer with a faith tradition. See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney
Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
50
The Court has noted repeatedly that children have constitutional rights independent of their
49

parents' rights, even if children must bring suit through their parents to satisfy procedural requirements. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 15-18 (2004); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). And, "[tihe psychological evidence suggests that even relatively young children can have personally meaningful
religious beliefs that, from a cognitive perspective, do not differ dramatically from those of
adults." Note, Children as Believers: Minors' Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology of Religious Development, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2205, 2226 (2002). Therefore, the Pierce, Meyer, Yoder
line of cases involving parental liberty rights is not applicable and a debate over whether the claim
is the parent's right or the student's right does not need to occur. See generally Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972); id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Emily Buss, What
Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 67-68 (2000).
51
Engaging in forum analysis raises issues beyond the scope of this article and is a step courts
seem to rarely take in cases involving student speech such as messages on T-shirts. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2004), affd, 445 F.3d 1166
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions to dismiss as
moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio
2005); Zamecnik ex. rel Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D.
Il1. Apr. 17, 2007); Sypnewski v. Warren Hills Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002);
Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Furthermore, of the
Supreme Court's four student speech cases (including Morse), only one-Hazelwood--explicitly
engages in a forum analysis. Forum analysis is more appropriate in situations where religious
student or community organizations seek to use public school premises on the same terms as nonreligious organizations and thus a school may have intentionally created a limited public forum.
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Com. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
274-76 (1981).
Last but certainly not least, Professor Taylor's article sets forth three specific reasons why
the forum analysis doctrine finds a particularly ill fit in elementary and secondary public schools.
Taylor, supra note 17, at 233-35; see also Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelinesfor Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1031-37
(1995).
52
This is in direct contrast to situations involving prayer at school-sponsored events such as
football games, Santa Fe Inde'p. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), or graduation ceremonies,
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). This also is in contrast to speech that can be perceived as
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speech that requires other students to respond in order to disassociate themselves from the message; 53 it is speech that may as easily occur at school as at
other locations rather than speech (such as a school assignment) that must by
definition occur in the school setting and which could incur penalties of an academic nature; 54 and the posture of any resulting case is that the school has restricted speech. 55 Practically speaking, it is similar to speech contained on but-

school-sponsored, such as the school newspaper situation in Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
See also my discussion of this issue supra note 10.
53
In situations of group practice such as a spoken prayer at graduation or classroom recitation
of the pledge of allegiance, silence and similar action on the part of one individual (e.g. standing
when everyone else stands) often suggests acceptance of the message. Action noticeably different
from the norm is needed to demonstrate disagreement with the message. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590-92, 593 (1992). Similarly, when materials are distributed in school, some
response is required from a receiving student-to take the flyer or pass the stack of flyers along to
the next student. See, e.g., Thompson by Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp.
1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987); Johnston-Loehner v. O'Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1994). In
contrast, students who disagree with another's T-shirt must not do anything to disassociate themselves with its message, for they are not associated with it in the first place, and similarly, they are
not put in a position of needing to manifest agreement or disagreement. See Christina Engstrom
Martin, Student-Initiated Religious Expression After Mergens and Weisman, Note, 61 U. Ci. L.
REV. 1565, 1580-81 (1994).
54
This is in contrast to situations in which a student is not permitted to complete an assignment by writing or presenting about a religious topic. See, e.g., Curry v. Sch. Dist. of the City of
Saginaw, 452 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Mich. 2006); DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp.
744 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Kathleen A. Brady,
The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDnAM L. REV.
1147, 1178, 1182 (2002); Chad Allred, Guarding the Treasure: Protection of Student Speech in
the Classroom, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 741 (1999); Lisa C. Shaw, Student-Initiated Religious
Speech, the Classroom, and the FirstAmendment: Why the Supreme Court Should Have Granted
Review in Settle v. Dickinson County School Board, 18 PACE L. REV. 255 (1998). In those situations, a student might be given a lower grade on the assignment. When students are suspended or
expelled from school, school policy sometimes permits them to make up work missed during the
suspension or expulsion and receive full or partial credit for it, so the discipline does not necessarily result in the double penalty of a resulting academic handicap. Compare Capistrano Unified
School District, San Juan Capistrano, California, available at http://www.capousd.org/board%
20policies/6154.PDF; Niles West High School, Niles Illinois, available at http://www.nileshs.kl 2.il.us/danrusRusk-AP_CalcAB.pdf; Greenfield High School, Greenfield, Wisconsin,
http://www.greenfield.kl2.wi.us/displaylrouter.asp?docid=1981, with Charlie Crist, Florida Attorney General, Advisory Legal Opinion No. AGO 2004-56 (Nov. 23, 2004), available at
http:l/myfloridalegal.comlago.nsf/Opinions/C922A501BO70CC5685256F55007745EE.
55
Consider the prayer at graduation cases and other cases brought primarily to contest alleged
Establishment Clause violations; in these situations, the school will most often affirmatively have
allowed an action or event that is disputed. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Lassonde v.
Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2001), 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
2003); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000); Harris v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), cert granted,judgment vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995), case remanded because moot, 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995).
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tons although the comparatively larger size of a T-shirt presents a greater likelihood of actually communicating a message to others.56
As such, the religious speech T-shirt situations present scenarios that in
many ways are quite similar to the Tinker black armband Vietnam protest scenario, and thus the competing interests are fairly familiar: on one side are the
public schools seeking to fulfill their basic educational function and corresponding obligation to the now forty-nine million public school students 57 who pass
through the proverbial schoolhouse gates each day.5 8 On the other side are students who are engaging in speech that may be particularly disruptive to the
school environment because of the viewpoint of the religiously-based message
being conveyed. 59
B.

Before Morse: The Student Speech Trilogy

In 2007, Morse became the fourth case decided by the Supreme Court to
focus on the restriction of public elementary and secondary students' speech.
Tinker commonly is considered the default standard, 60 with Fraserand Hazelwood creating two specific exceptions and Morse now a third. 6'
1.

Tinker's Disruptiveness, and the Rights of Others

Tinker has been called the "high water mark" of student speech rights.62
This section discusses its two legal standards.
a.

Materialand SubstantialDisruption

The test for which Tinker is well-known and oft-cited is that student
speech may be restricted if it "materially and substantially interfere [s],,63 with
"the requirements of appropriate discipline" 64 or "schoolwork," or if such inter56

Professor Taylor also notes that the T-shirt situations are more likely to give rise to contro-

versy and ultimately cases because T-shirts are "more likely to be detected by school officials and
harder for students to avoid than verbal remarks outside the classroom." Taylor, supra note 17, at
n.4.
57

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, FAST

FACTS (2007), availableat http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=65.
58
Accord Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
59
60

Id.
Scholars have questioned Tinker's continuing viability. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note

7.
61 Trotter, supra note 6 at 20-23; Linda Greenhouse, Court Hears Whether a Drug Statement
is ProtectedFree Speechfor Students, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A16.
62
Numerous scholars and commentators use this term to describe Tinker. See, e.g., Benjamin
Dowling-Sendor, Nuisance andNonsense, 191 AM. SCH. BD. J. (Mar. 2004).
63
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
64
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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ference is reasonably anticipated by school officials. 65 Giving shape to this test,
the Court stated that "the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint" 66 would not create a level of disruption sufficient to
justify restricting the speech. The Court explained further that "the prohibition
of expression of one particular opinion" is not permissible absent such a disruption or reasonable anticipation thereof.67 Tinker never explicitly stated whether
viewpoint discrimination was permissible under the facially neutral purpose of
suppressing speech significantly disruptive to the educational environment.6 8
However, the focus of the disruption test and the Court's subsequent language
clarifying that test are consistent with the idea that one particular perspective
could cause a level and type of disruption sufficient to justify quashing it in
what would amount to viewpoint discrimination, even if other perspectives on
the same issue do not create the same level of disruption and thus would not be
suppressed. 69

65

Id. at 509, 510.

66

Id. at 509.
Id. at 511,513.

67

This has not stopped some courts from seeing definitive language in Tinker regarding the
permissibility of viewpoint discrimination. Harper v. Poway, 445 F.3d 1166, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Indeed, the Court in Tinker held that a school may prohibit student speech, even if the consequence is viewpoint discrimination, if the speech violates the rights of other students or is materially disruptive."), cert. granted,judgment vacated, case remanded with instructionsto dismiss as
moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir.
2004) (Tinker "applies to school regulations directed at specific student viewpoints" (citing Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437,442 (5th Cir. 2001))).
69
To be clear: this language would seem to permit viewpoint discrimination only to the extent
that a particular viewpoint satisfies the disruption standard, not necessarily to the extent that a
school administrator disagrees with the student's viewpoint or finds the viewpoint inconsistent
with the school's message or mission. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 513. See generally Taylor, supra
note 17.
Petitioner Morse in Morse v. Frederickpresented this interpretation of Tinker as well. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 15, available at http://www.abanet.orgpublicedlpreviewbriefs/pdfs/0607/06-278_PetitionerReply.pdf; see also Morse, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2007 WL 880748, at *7-9 (Mar.
19, 2007).
In a blog post on The Volokh Conspiracy about Morse, Professor Eugene Volokh commented,
[S]ometimes speech that's hostile based on race, religion, or sexual orientation-as well as speech that offends people for a wide variety of other reasons-might indeed lead to substantial disruption. But this is at least a facially viewpoint-neutral standard that potentially applies to speech on all perspectives, and doesn't categorically cast out certain viewpoints from First
Amendment protection. While the standard isn't without its problems, it is at
least basically consistent with the First Amendment principle of "equality of
status in the field of ideas."
Eugene Volokh, Sorry, Your Viewpoint is Excluded from FirstAmendment Protection,available
at http://volokh.com/posts/1145577196.shtml (Apr. 20, 2006).
68
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Simply stated, some viewpoints are more disruptive than others.7 ° Specifically, some religious viewpoints can be more disruptive than other religious
or secular viewpoints about the same topic. Predicting whether a given message
will create a substantial and material disruption in a particular school can be
difficult even for an administrator in that school who knows its history and is
familiar with the student body. For an outsider to try to make a factual judgment about the reasonableness of the administrator's view in a situation where
context matters so substantially is even more challenging, thus it may not be
surprising that courts vary in their deference to administrators' determinations
on this latter topic, 71 especially if the disruption anticipated by the administrator
was not borne out.
Because of the highly fact-specific nature of these situations, looking to
reported cases for indications of which statements might or might not cause a
substantial and material disruption is only minimally helpful. Three of the four
federal district courts to evaluate student religious T-shirt speech cases engaged
in the Tinker disruption analysis: Harper v. Poway, Nixon v. Northern Local
School District,and K.D. v. Fillmore Central School District. Avoiding Tinker,
the Seventh Circuit in Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie School District read circuit
law to require a different analysis.72 The district courts in Harper, Nixon, and
K.D. all found that the T-shirts in question did not or would not have constituted
Some view Tinker as rejecting a school policy that was viewpoint-based because it prohibited black armbands only. For example, in its online Education Policy Issue Site available as a
resource for educators, the Education Commission of the States writes, "Central to the court's
decision [in Tinker] was the fact that the policy was "viewpoint-specific" and did not ban other
clothing that expressed controversial views, including Iron Crosses, often seen as symbols of
Hitler and the Nazis. This aspect of the decision is consistent with a number of later Supreme
Court decisions signaling that viewpoint-specific dress restrictions violate the First Amendment."
Education Commission of the States, Uniforms/Dress Codes, ECS Education Policy Issue Site,
available at http://www.ecs.org/htmlUIssueSection.asp?issueid=145&s=Overview. But, others
argue more generally that Tinker policy was content-based. See, e.g., Memorandum for United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs Motion to Preliminary Injunction at n.5, Westfield
High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. Westfield Pub. Sch., No. 03-30008 (Feb. 19, 2003).
70
West v. Derby, 206 F. 1358 (10th Cir. 2000) (Confederate flag images prohibited under
school policy; prohibition was constitutional). See also Rutherford Institute, Teaching Public
Schools the ABCs of the Constitution-PartII, Students' Free Speech Rights in Public Schools,
(Aug. 13, 2003), available at http://www.rutherford.org/.
71
See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 972-74 (S.D. Ohio
2005) (concluding that the school officials did not satisfy the "reasonable anticipation" test in the
case before it and reviewing other courts' applications of this test); but see Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1171-72, n.6 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (the district court did hold
that previous events had given rise to reasonable anticipation of substantial or material disruption
and although the appellate court also reached the conclusion that Harper's speech could be barred
under Tinker, it based its decision on another aspect of Tinker), cert. granted,judgment vacated,
case remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. This is not to say that courts should defer
entirely to school administrators' decisions across the board or to assume that all administrators
operate in good faith.
72
Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 969-74; Harper, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Zamecnik ex rel.
Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007).
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a material and substantial disruption under Tinker.73 Harper's T-shirt, quoted at
the beginning of this article, stated on the front: "BE ASHAMED/ OUR
SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED," and on the back:
"HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL Romans 1:27." 74 Nixon's T-shirt bore
the message "INTOLERANT/ Jesus said . . .I am the way, the truth and the

life. John 14:6" on the front, and on the back it said, "Homosexuality is a sin!/
75
Islam is a lie!/ Abortion is murder!/ Some issues are just black and white!,
K.D.'s T-shirt, also quoted at the beginning of this article, read on the front
"ABORTION IS HOMICIDE" and on the back "YOU WILL NOT SILENCE
MY MESSAGE/ YOU WILL NOT MOCK MY GOD/ YOU WILL STOP
KILLING MY GENERATION/ ROCK FOR LIFE!" (Zamecnik's T-shirt contained the phrase "Be Happy, Not Gay." 76 ) The consistent findings in Harper,
Nixon, and K.D. could seem to suggest that T-shirts with these or similar messages are unlikely ever to be sufficiently disruptive to permit their censorship
under Tinker. This might be the case, but speculating about the degree to which
the reactions of these school communities are representative of other schools'
reactions to these same anti-gay and anti-abortion statements would be unwise.
Generally, though, it is plausible that these statements could cause substantially
more disruption in some schools, especially those with a history of conflict
about the issues implicated by the T-shirt speech,77 and less in others.
Furthermore, these three students' T-shirts probably would not be the
most controversial of all available student religious T-shirts in many communities. A 2005 survey by Government Professor James L. Gibson and Marc Mojore Howard evaluated antipathy towards Communists, atheists, radical Muslims, and religious (presumably Christian) fundamentalists. 78 Atheists were
disliked to some degree by 79.6% of respondents, closely followed by radical
Muslims at 78.5%, and Communists at 73.4%. Only 39.1% of respondents expressed any level of dislike toward religious fundamentalists. 79 Extrapolating
Gibson and Howard's findings to the context discussed in this article suggests
that in many communities across the United States, student speech promoting
atheism or Islam (or speech that clearly is motivated by an atheist or a Muslim
perspective) might create more disruption than the speech on the T-shirts discussed in this article.
73

Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74; Harper,345 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.

74

Harper,445 F.3d at 1171, cert. granted,judgment vacated, case remanded with instructions

to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007).
75 Nixon, 383 F. Supp.2d at 967.
77

Zamecnik, 2007 WL 1141597, at *1.
See, e.g., West v. Derby, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362-63, 1366-67 (10th Cir. 2000).

78

James L. Gibson, Intoleranceand PoliticalRepression in the UnitedStates: A Half-Century

76

After McCarthyism (Working Paper No. 20, Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://polisci.wustl.edu/
media/download.php?page=faculty&paper=85.
79

Id.
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Additionally, it is important to recognize that speech overtly critical of a
particular faith tradition may be perceived with more hostility by those within
that faith tradition than those outside it. Consider, for example, the caricatures
of Mohammed printed in a Danish newspaper in September 2005.80 It would
not be difficult for someone unfamiliar with the Islamic faith tradition to recognize the cartoons as mocking Islam, but many Muslims considered the cartoons
to rise far beyond offense to the level of blasphemy. 8 1 Thus a T-shirt carrying a
similar cartoon might generate a few raised eyebrows and disapproving glances
in a school with no Islamic students (possible discomfort), but worn in a school
with a portion of its population Muslim, the reaction could be much more severe
(potentially substantial and material disruption). Depending on what other student speech was allowed, such a restriction easily could create an instance of
viewpoint discrimination.
b.

Rights of Others

The second and even more nebulous test from Tinker-and one almost
never determinative-is that one student's speech may not "collid[e] with" or
"inva[de]" the rights of other students; if it does, it may be prohibited.8 2 Harper
v. Poway from the Ninth Circuit and Saxe v. State College Area School District83 from the Third Circuit are directly at odds as to the meaning of this aspect

of Tinker, 84 with significant consequence. If this test has independent meaning,
See http://www.brusselsjoumal.com/node/698 (containing the cartoons and a short summary
of the conflict).
81 Michael Slackman, Iran Exhibits Anti-Jewish Art as Reply to Danish Cartoons,N.Y. TIMES,
80

Aug. 25, 2006, at A8.
82
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). The decision in
Hazelwood sidestepped the opportunity to define this test further.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.5 (1988). In dissent in Hazelwood, Justice Brennan wrote in
reference to this test that "[i]f that term is to have any content, it must be limited to rights that are
protected by law. 'Any yardstick less exacting than [that] could result in school officials curtailing speech at the slightest fear of disturbance .
I...'
Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1376 (8th Cir. 1986)). See also David L.
Hudson, Tinkering with Tinker Standards?First Amendment Center, Aug. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/analysis.aspx?id= 17253.
83
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
In Harper, the Ninth Circuit described Harper's anti-gay speech as falling into an unprotected category of speech that constitutes a "verbal assault [on other students] on the basis of a
core identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation." Harper,445 F.3d at
1178.
In Saxe, now-Justice Alito rejected this idea of a harassment exception, writing for the panel
that "a wide variety of speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive, including statements
that impugn another's race or national origin or that denigrate religious beliefs" may not be prohibited under Tinker. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206.
In an amicus brief filed at the district court level in another case, the United States argued:
"The mere fact that school administrators believe that certain speech may offend other students is
insufficient to censor speech. This is as true with speech expressing a religious viewpoint that
84
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as the Ninth Circuit concluded that it did in an opinion later vacated because the
underlying case had become moot, restricting student speech under Tinker's illdefined second test could be notably easier for schools than restricting the same
speech under the material and substantial disruption test, especially because
religious beliefs often are central to an individual's identity and thus a particularly sensitive subject.85
The potential practical effects the Ninth Circuit's approach would have
on viewpoint discrimination against religious speech are unclear, however.
First, let us set aside for a moment the presumption prohibiting viewpoint discrimination. If individuals more likely to be the target of aggressive speech are
those in the minority in that community, 86 then viewpoints critical of minority
groups (as in Harper)may be more frequently restricted under this test than
viewpoints critical of majority groups, although the same general rule would
apply to all speech. However, cases and anecdotes suggest that the "minority
groups" that would be the target of aggressive religious speech probably would
include gays and lesbians, women who do not ascribe to traditional gender roles,
Muslims, Jews, Christian fundamentalists, and others.87 Thus, the "rights of
others" test from Tinker easily could prohibit religious speech from a wide variety of political, social, and religious viewpoints. And, although majority groups
may not be targeted as frequently or affected in the same way by aggressive
speech focusing on them, majority groups certainly are not immune from criticism and thus also could be protected under this aspect of Tinker. Therefore,
depending on how the "rights of others" concept is defined, Tinker's second test
could have a very broad effect. But, before Tinker's second test fills school
principals' offices across the country with students wearing T-shirts with mildly
critical messages, it is worth remembering the discomfort/disruption distinction
from Tinker's first test and applying that principle to Tinker's second test.
On the other hand, if a presumptive requirement of viewpoint neutrality
trumps this aspect of Tinker, as the Third Circuit suggested, then the "rights of
others" test would lose most, if not all, of the independent effect the Ninth Circuit would give it. If the school permitted speech in support of gay and lesbian
students, as it did in Harper,the school could not prohibit Tyler Harper's "Homosexuality is shameful" T-shirt, no matter what internal effect it might have on
may make some students uncomfortable as it is with any other viewpoint that others may find
unsettling." Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, No. 03-30008 (filed Feb. 19,
2003).
85

Daniel Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the EstablishmentClause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv.

1113, 1164-65 (1988).
86
See generally FRANK RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION (1999); Philip Gleason, Minorities (Almost) All: The Minority Concept in American Social Thought, 43 AM.

Q.

392

(1991).
87
See sources cited supra note 4; see also Harper,445 F.3d at 1178; Nixon v. N. Local Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Zamecnik ex rel. Zamecnik v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 2007 WL 1141597 (N.D. I11.
Apr. 17, 2007).
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other students. 88 Harper's T-shirt and others like it only could be prohibited if
their messages were phrased in a vulgar or obscene manner, thus implicating
Fraser,or violated Tinker's first prong.8 9 Religious and non-religious speech
intruding on the rights of others would need to be permitted in nearly all circumstances. 9°
Thus, Tinker's silence on how its two tests fit with the principle of
viewpoint neutrality has created confusion. But, it is clear that giving full effect
either to Tinker's first, well-known "substantial and material disruption" test or
to the second more obscure "rights of others" test inevitably requires some
viewpoint discrimination to occur, although the two tests implicate viewpoint
discrimination in slightly different ways.
2.

Fraser'sLewd, Crude, and Otherwise Out-of-Line Criteria

The second of the student free speech cases, Fraser,involved a high
school student who delivered a short speech filled with sexual innuendo at an
all-school assembly when he nominated a classmate for student body vicepresident. The Court in Fraserdid not apply a clear, singular test, 9' although
the case generally is cited for the principle that students' speech is not protected
if its manner is "vulgar," "lewd," or "plainly offensive. 9 2 Fraseralso added to
the doctrine the idea that the school could restrict the speech at issue in large
part because such speech contravened the school's "basic educational mission"
of creating the next generation of citizens, and the school district was the appropriate body to define its own mission.93
About fifteen years after Fraserwas decided, its principles came into
play in what arguably could be characterized as a fifth student religious T-shirt
case, albeit one of a very different sort than Harper,Nixon, Zamecnik, or K.D.
In Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, Nicholas Boroff was prohibited
from wearing "Marilyn Manson" T-shirts to school. 94 On the front of one of the
T-shirts, a picture of a three-headed Jesus appeared along with the words "See
88
89

Harper,445 F.3d at 1192-1207 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

Only rare exceptions may exist and if so they are likely to occur as violations of existing
anti-harassment law, such as the provisions of Title VII, that have been interpreted to hold schools
liable for student-on-student sexual harassment in certain circumstances. See Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640-44 (1999) (setting forth the criteria for when schools
become liable for peer-on-peer sexual harassment).
91
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626-27 (2007); See also Ryan, supra note 10, at 1356.
92
Fraser,478 U.S. at 683.
93
Id. at 681, 683, 685. Thus, in Morse, the school district employed Fraser to argue that
because part of the school district's mission was to deter illegal drug use, the school could quash
speech in opposition to that mission. The school district in Morse was not the first to make such
an argument. See Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465,470 (6th Cir. 2000).
94
220 F.3d at 467, 469.
90
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No Truth. Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth"; the back of the same T-shirt featured the word "BELIEVE" with "LIE" highlighted. 95 The Sixth Circuit's twojudge majority concluded that the T-shirt could be prohibited under Fraserbecause this T-shirt and the others "contain symbols and words that promote values that are so patently contrary to the school's educational mission." 96 The
principal had described the school's mission as "to be respectful of others and
others' beliefs. 9 7 As in Harper, by prohibiting Boroff s speech the school
demonstrated that it was more tolerant of some of its students' views than others'.
The appellate dissent's criticism in Boroff was intense, concluding unequivocally that the school district's action constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination: "Indeed, from Principal Clifton's explanation, it would not be
unreasonable to presume that if the T-shirt had depicted Jesus in a positive light,
it would not have been considered 'offensive.' 98 Even though neither the parties nor the courts treated Boroff s speech as religious, 99 this case recalls the
tension present in Harper,Nixon, Zamecnik, and K.D. when so-called supportive or positive viewpoints are permitted (in actuality or hypothetically), but
critical viewpoints are not. 1°°
On this topic, the FraserCourt noted:
These fundamental values of "habits and manners of civility"
essential to a democratic society must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when the
views expressed may be unpopular. But these "fundamental
values" must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and in the case of a school, the sensibilities of
fellow students 0 1
95

Id. at 467.

96

Id. at 470.

Id. at 469.
98
Id. at 473 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
99
Id. at 470 (Gilman, J., dissenting) ("The record is devoid of any evidence that the T-shirts,
the 'three-headed Jesus' T-shirt particularly, were perceived to express any particular political or
religious viewpoint.").
100 Harper, 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,judgment vacated, case remanded
with instructions to dismiss as moot, 127 S. Ct. 1484 (2007); Nixon, 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D.
Ohio 2005).
Although the rule of permitting positive messages but disallowing negative ones may be
appealing to some as a bright-line policy, it is not a panacea. For example, under this rule a "Homosexuality is shameful" T-shirt would be barred. But, what positive message expresses this
same message? A stick figure man plus a stick figure woman "= Marriage"? "Straight pride"?
The connotations are different, but the underlying message is the same and it is not a positive one.
See also Taylor, supra note 17, at n.34.
101
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
97
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Professor Marty Lederman views this excerpt from Fraserto mean that "viewpoint discrimination is, in fact, inconsistent with the core functions of a public
school. ' 1 °2 His reading emphasizes the first part of the excerpt, that students
should learn to exercise tolerance for different and even unpopular ideas they
hear. Yet, the second part of the excerpt (concern about other students) qualifies
the first part and suggests that restrictions on the student speaker also could
comprise part of an appropriate training in civic discourse. To a degree this
latter sentiment echoes the school districts' arguments in Boroff and Morse, and
also is reminiscent of the second test in Tinker. However, Fraser'slanguage is
milquetoast compared to Tinker's rights of others discussion., 03
Like Tinker, Fraser never directly addresses whether viewpoint discrimination is permitted in schools, although the question of viewpoint discrimination is further away from the categorically unprotected speech in Fraser
than from the political speech in Tinker that is presumptively protected.
3.

Hazelwood's School-Sponsored Speech

The next case, Hazelwood, is the only case of these first three to directly
engage a forum analysis, and the one to deal most closely (although still not
explicitly) with viewpoint discrimination. This case began when a high school
principal excised two pages of the school newspaper before publication because
those pages contained, separately, articles about teenage pregnancy and divorce
which the principal believed were inappropriate for the student audience and did
not reflect proper journalistic practices.' ° 4 The Court first determined that because the school did not intentionally designate the school newspaper as a public forum, the school could restrict the contents of the newspaper (the forum) in
"any reasonable manner," and reasonableness in that case meant having "legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 05 This speech had the dual character of being
student speech and also being school-sponsored speech, and the school could
10 6
restrict the speech because of its authority to control speech attributable to it.
Hazelwood's primary contribution to the viewpoint discrimination debate grew out of this concern about the school controlling speech it could appear
to be endorsing: "[a] school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol
102

Marty Lederman, When is Viewpoint Discriminationa Constitutional Virtue?, SCOTUS-

blog (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com.
103
If the school is able to determine its own mission and its obligations to students include
preparation for citizenship, a policy that students act in a manner respectful of one another may
further its purpose. However, depending on the specific contours of such a policy, a school district may explicitly be permitting viewpoint discrimination in a way that would extend beyond
Tinker's protections.
104 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988).
105

Id. at 267-70, 273.

106

Id. at 271-72.
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use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values
of a civilized order."",10 7 In this way, when students' speech effectively also
becomes the speech of the school, public schools are no different from other
governmental bodies which can engage in viewpoint discrimination regarding
their own messages. 1 8 Yet, writing in dissent, Justice Brennan honed in on that
aspect of the majority's decision: "The case before us," he wrote, "aptly illustrates how readily school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the 'mere' protection of students from sensitive topics."' 0 9
However, the extent to which Hazelwood applies when government is
merely permitting student speech (e.g., a student is not prohibited from wearing
a T-shirt) as opposed to sponsoring it (e.g., the school newspaper) is unclear.
Thus, as recently as 2005, the Second Circuit identified a circuit split on the
question of "[wihether Hazelwood represents a departure from the long-held
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in any and all government restriction of
private speech"' " 1 (emphasis added) such as the student religious speech T-shirt
situations.
107

Id. at 272 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has read this provision of Hazelwood as

permitting content-based discrimination. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.3d 1314, 1324-25 (1lth Cir.
1989).
108
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995);
Downs v. L.A..Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000); Hansen v. Ann Arbor
Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003). See also Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
631 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (7th Cir.1980); Cary v. Bd. of Educ. Arapahoe Sch. Dist., 598 F.2d 535,
543 (10th Cir. 1979) (both permitting the school to engage in viewpoint discrimination regarding
its own message).
During oral argument in Morse, members of the current Court suggested on a more general
note that the viewpoint neutrality requirement does not apply to curricular speech in the classroom, and could not do so without derailing the educational process. (Chief Justice Roberts)
Transcript of Oral Arg., Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06-278.pdf.
JUSTICE ALITO: I find that a very.. . disturbing argument, because schools
have and they can define their educational mission so broadly that they can
suppress all sorts of political speech and speech expressing fundamental values of the students, under the banner of... getting rid of speech that's inconsistent with educational missions.
Transcript of Oral Arg. at 20, Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/06-278.pdf ; see also Marty Lederman, Brief
Notes on Morse Oral Argument, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.scotusblog.com/.
109
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 288, 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing viewpoint discrimination as "illegitimate").
110 Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
Emily Gold Waldman provides a thorough discussion of the two circuit splits growing out of
Hazelwood. See Waldman, supra note 45, passim.
Not all cases cited by the Second Circuit in Peck involve students' speech. The First and
Tenth Circuits have expressly held that educators may "make viewpoint-based decisions about
school-sponsored speech." Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926-28
(10th Cir. 2002). See also Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993). The Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits have, instead, decided that Hazelwood did not alter the general requirement of
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Viewpoint Discriminationin a Limited Public Forum

A well-known tenet of constitutional law is that government action that
discriminates among speakers based on their viewpoint is presumptively invalid."' The Court itself has applied this principle in the public elementary and
secondary school context.'12 So, how can the Court's student speech cases potentially override this general rule and permit viewpoint discrimination?
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District113 and
Good News Club v. Milford Central School' 14 are the most on point of any of

the Court's cases explicitly addressing viewpoint discrimination, yet even they
are not on all fours with the type of situations examined in this article. Both
Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club involved religious speech and occurred in

the public elementary and secondary school setting."

5

However, the speech at

issue was not students'-it belonged to community organizations who were
denied the opportunity to use school facilities during non-school hours when the
school facilities were opened to the public for specific uses." 6 At this point in
viewpoint neutrality in non-public fora. See Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County
Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (applying, without discussion, the Cornelius viewpoint neutrality standard to a nonpublic school forum); Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1319 n.7;
see also Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that
"despite the absence of express 'viewpoint neutrality' discussion anywhere in Hazelwood, the
Planned Parenthood court incorporated 'viewpoint neutrality' analysis into nonpublic forum,
school-sponsored speech cases in our Circuit" (citing Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 825), but
deciding, ultimately, that Hazelwood did not supply the appropriate standard for the issue before
it). A panel of the Third Circuit held that a viewpoint restriction "may reasonably be related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns" and therefore constitutional, but on rehearing en banc, the circuit
was equally-divided on the question. See C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir.
1999), vacated and reh'g en banc granted by 197 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd in part en banc by
an equally divided court, vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir .2000) (affirming
the district court judgment regarding one expressive act without explication and deciding the
remaining expressive issue on procedural grounds, thereby obviating the need to reach the viewpoint neutrality question); see also Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a
Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in the School Speech Cases, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217,
231-38 (2004).
I
Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984). The
Supreme Court also has applied this principle to the higher education context, striking down a
university's decision to deny publication funding to a religious student organization. Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
112
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
113 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384.
114
Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98.
"15
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98.
116 In Lamb's Chapel, the local school board's policy was adopted pursuant to a state statute
that allowed public schools to be used during non-school hours for specific purposes, including
"social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainment, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall
be open to the general public." 508 U.S. at 386. Because religious meetings were not included in
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time, after the school day had ended, the school facilities were fairly interchangeable with other government buildings such as the city hall or a community center. Thus, because of their facts, neither Lamb's Chapel nor Good News
Club had to fully engage the issue of viewpoint discrimination in the school-asactive-educational-setting context. 17 As such, one important distinction between those two cases and the student T-shirt speech situations is that the regulation of speech in Lamb's Chapel and Good News Club occurred in a limited,
or designated, public forum as opposed to the closed forum in which the student
T-shirt speech controversies usually occur."1 8 That is not to say that these cases
are wholly irrelevant to the situations examined in this article, but rather that
their presumptive prohibition against viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum could be justifiably distinguished.
First, in Lamb's Chapel, a local church asked to use school facilities after hours to show films about parenting.1 1 9 The school district denied the
church's request because the films approached these issues from a religious perspective and the district was concerned that permitting such use of its facilities
would constitute an Establishment Clause violation.12 In 1993, the Supreme
Court struck down the district's action as impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 121 In reaching this result, the Court also rejected the district's argument
the list, a lower state court had held that religious meetings could not be permitted. Id. at 386-87.
In Good News Club, the local school board's policy was adopted pursuant to the same provision
of the state statute as well as one other: that school facilities can be used after hours for "instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts." 533 U.S. at 102.
For example, in its Establishment Clause discussion, the Good News opinion takes care to
117
distance the disputed events from the classroom setting, focusing on the adult in charge (teacher or
non-teacher), the time (during school or after school), and the level of parental consent necessary
(compelled attendance in public school versus parental consent required to attend the club's meetings). Id. at 117-18.
118
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. The forum matters
because, in general, the more open a forum is, the less the government can regulate the speech
occurring there. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07. For a discussion of the general
inapplicability of the forum analysis to situations occurring in public elementary and secondary
schools during the school day, see Taylor, supra note 17, at 233-36.
Admittedly, the Day of Silence situations do pose some difficulty for the argument that the
school is not involved in permitting the speech because, in the usual course of things, the student
planners secure permission from the school administration before they organize a group of students who will refrain from speaking in classes and all other activities throughout the day. Thus,
the Day of Silence speech is sanctioned by the school in a way that Harper's T-shirt would not be.
Even if Harper asked for and received advance permission to wear his T-shirt, other students
probably would not assume it was school-approved and would be even less likely to assume it was
school-endorsed or school-sponsored. However, this does not necessarily constitute the creation
and intentional opening of a forum, as with a policy specifying the use of district facilities. And,
if the students were not remaining silent but instead all planned to wear the same T-shirt, they
probably would not be as likely to seek advance approval from the school.
119
508 U.S. at 387.
Id. at 388-89, 394-95.
120
121
Id. at 392-93.
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that "den[ying] use of its property to a 'radical' church for the purpose of proselytizing [avoided] threats of public unrest and even violence," noting that facts
which would substantiate this concern were absent from the record and "in any
event [this argument] would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the presentation of a [specific] religious point of view about a subject the District otherwise opens to discussion on District property."122 Tinker is not applicable in
the Lamb's Chapel situation because the speech is not a student's nor did it occur during the school day, but the school district's argument is reminiscent of
the general concern in Tinker that speech in a school can be suppressed if it is
disruptive enough. Although the Court was not receptive to this Tinker-type
argument in Lamb's Chapel based on the facts of the situation or the general
state of the law, it did not eliminate the possibility that such an exception to the
generally applicable viewpoint neutrality requirement could exist.
Second, after Lamb's Chapel, circuits split on the issue of "whether
speech can be excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious
nature of the speech"; the Supreme Court took up this issue in Good News Club,
decided in 2001.123 In that case, the Court struck down a school district's decision to deny the request of a community-based religious club for children to
meet on school premises after school hours. 124 In doing so, the Court stated that
it "reaffirm[ed] [the] holdings in Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger that speech
discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited
public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.' 25 The Court also explained in depth why the school district's Establishment Clause "defense" lacked merit. 26 However, it noted that "whether a
State's interest in avoiding an [actual] Establishment Clause violation would
justify viewpoint discrimination" remained an open question.127 Like Lamb's
Chapel, Good News Club thus suggested that the presumptive prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination in schools even when the forum is limited (and
not, as is presumed in this article, closed) may be slightly more porous than of28
ten assumed. 1

122

Id. at 395-96.

123

533 U.S. at 106.

124

Id. at 120.

125

Id. at 1 11-12 (emphasis added).

126

Id. at 112-19.

127

Id. at 113.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky summarizes the general distinction:

128

The requirement that the government be content-neutral in its regulation of
speech means that the government must be both viewpoint neutral and subject
matter neutral. Viewpoint neutral means that the government cannot regulate
speech based on the ideology of the message ....

Subject matter neutral

means that the government cannot regulate speech based on the topic of the
speech.
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Bringing Morse into the Viewpoint DiscriminationDebate

As mentioned earlier, Morse-the "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner
case-is not a religious speech case. 129 Yet, it is a case that touches on the issue
of viewpoint discrimination in the public school setting although the justices'
opinions addressed this issue only briefly. After summarizing the opinions in
Morse, this section considers the implications Morse may have regarding viewpoint discrimination in the student religious T-shirt speech situations.
1.

The Morse Opinions

In Morse, a five-justice majority of the Court held that a public high
school principal acted constitutionally when she required high school student
Joseph Frederick to take down his infamous "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" banner
(displayed when the Olympic torch parade passed in front of the school) and
Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When The Government Must Make Content-Based
Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 202-03 (1994). In dissent in Good News Club, Justice Stevens
suggested that it is consistent with a school's educational mission to define the forum as one in
which speech from a religious viewpoint is permitted, but religious proselytizing is not. Good
News Club, 533 U.S. at 130-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The somewhat ill-defined relationship between subject-matter-based and viewpoint-based
discrimination suggests that the idea of viewpoint neutrality is not uncompromising. Yet, because
the Court has declared that the prohibition of all religious speech and one religious viewpoint both
are classified as viewpoint discrimination, massaging that distinction in the context of religious
speech is difficult. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384-85. Two years after Lamb's Chapel was
decided, the four dissenters in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819, 831 (1995), disputed the conclusion that prohibiting religion was viewpoint discrimination because the prohibition of a class of viewpoints is just as much viewpoint discrimination as
the prohibition of one, which the majority in Rosenberger reiterated. Compare with id. at 895
(Souter, J., dissenting). Earlier, in Widmar and Mergens, the Court had classified discrimination
against religious speech or association as content based. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270
(1981); Mergens v. Bd. of Educ., 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990).
For further discussion of this issue, see also KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 72-74 (2005); Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and Distrust, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.
1171, 1172-73 (1993); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First
Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 109, 118 (1986); Susan Ehrmann, Note, Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protectionsfor Religious Speech Through The Illusion of Public Forum Analysis, 1994 WiS. L. REV. 965, 973 n.53
(1994) (discussing the teachers' mailboxes case Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)); Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 643
(1994) ("As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based."). Highlighting and arguing
against another possible exception to the viewpoint neutrality requirement, the American Center
for Law and Justice, filing an amicus brief in Morse, relied on Good News Club to argue that
Frederick's banner was viewpoint discrimination (because an anti-drug banner presumably would
have been permissible) and that even the school's pursuit of its educational mission does not justify viewpoint discrimination. Brief for the Am. Ctr. For Law & Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6-8, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (Feb. 20, 2007) (No. 06-278).
129 Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2624 (2007).
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then suspended him. 130 The Court did not employ the first or second Tinker test
but instead, as in Fraser and Hazelwood, created another discrete category of
student speech that the school could restrict, in effect another exception to
Tinker. 13' The limited holding in Morse stated that "schools may take steps to
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use .... ,132 The Court based this conclusion
on schools' unique relationship to their students, which creates schools' "important-indeed, perhaps compelling" interest in deterring drug abuse. 133 The
Court also explicitly declined to expand the "plainly offensive" standard from
Fraser to justify the principal's action in Morse, writing that to do so would
"stretch[] Fraser too far" because "[a]fter all, much political and religious
speech might be perceived as offensive to some."' 134 The Morse majority opinion
was written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito.
Justice Alito also wrote separately to clarify the terms on which he
joined the majority:
[The Court] (a) . . . goes no further than to hold that a public
school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) . . . provides no
support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue, including
speech on issues such as "the wisdom of135the war on drugs or of
legalizing marijuana for medicinal use."'
Because Justice Alito joined the majority opinion in full rather than concurring
in the judgment, his concurrence appears to provide a useful window into his
binding precedent. (Justice Kennedy
views on these issues, but not to create
136
joined Justice Alito's concurrence.)
130
131

Id. at 2622-23.

132

Id. at 2620. Some commentators read Morse as in fact broadly applicable because the justi-

Id. at passim.

fication supporting the school's action basically "that drugs are really harmful and really illegal"
applies to "[v]irtually all restrictive speech policies." Posting of David French to http://phibetacons.nationalreview.com/post/?q=ZDUxMjJkZWVmZTBhMjFkYjlwZWU2ZGZiZGRiMjdlM2Q
= (June 25, 2007, 12:19 p.m.).
133
Id. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
'34
Id. Although this statement refers directly to Fraser,it suggests that a majority of the Court
does not share the vacated Ninth Circuit panel's view regarding the meaning of Tinker's second
test.
135
Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
136
Justice Alito's first condition may appear to establish Morse's controlling rule because it
could be characterized as the narrowest point of agreement for the majority. See Posting of
Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy blog, http://volokh.com/archives/archive-2007_06_242007_06_30.shtml (June 26, 2007, 12:09 a.m.). See also Taylor, supra note 17, at n.23. Further-
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Similarly, Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion and also wrote
separately to argue that Tinker itself is without constitutional basis.' 37 Justice
Breyer concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, preferring to
decide the case on qualified immunity grounds rather than on its merits.138 Jus139
tice Stevens wrote for the dissent, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
The main point of dispute between the majority and the dissent was the banner's
meaning: the dissent found 14the
banner could not be "reasonably regarded as
0
promoting illegal drug use."'
Setting aside this difference on a central question of fact, the Court did
not diminish protection for students' political speech (as Frederick's speech
could have been if it advocated, for example, support of the medical use of
marijuana for pain management).' 4' Considering dicta in the majority opinion
as well as language in the concurrences, four of the five justices from the Morse
majority seem to support the principle of staunchly protecting student political
speech.142 But even if only Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy would agree with
this principle, they are joined at least by the three justices in dissent. 43 The
ramifications of this apparent limited consensus are unclear, however; if students' political speech had been the question before the Court, then the Court
may have had to directly engage the continued viability of the Tinker test.
2.

Implications for Viewpoint Discrimination

Trying to ascertain what Morse may mean for viewpoint discrimination,
particularly in the student T-shirt situations that are the focus of this article, is
important at least in a very practical sense. School administrators regularly
must make decisions about whether students wearing T-shirts like Harper's,
Nixon's, Zamecnik's, K.D.'s and Boroff's have done something deserving punishment-and those decisions often implicate unresolved legal questions such as
the permissibility of limited viewpoint discrimination. Because of the murkimore, as Professor Eugene Volokh notes, the same speech could satisfy both of Justice Alito's
qualifications, potentially being banned as advocacy of illegal drug use and protected as speech
about a political or social issue. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy blog,
supra.

137
138
139
140
141
142

Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629-30 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 2638 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
See generally id. at 2643-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2620.
Id. at 2625, 2629; id. at 2649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2625-26; id. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2629-36, passim (Thomas, J.,

concurring) (Justice Thomas, who joined the majority opinion, wrote separately in concurrence
and set forth his opinion that the Court reached the correct outcome because students do not have
free speech rights in public schools).
143 Id. at 2649-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's concurrence did not address the
merits of the underlying case.
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ness of the law in this area, a school district official acting in good faith but
making the "wrong" decision in these situations (a decision that ultimately is
determined to run afoul of the Constitution) presumably would be shielded from
liability under the principle of qualified immunity. 144 But, many if not most
school districts and their lawyers would prefer to avoid creating liability in the
first place. Although the Court's school speech cases do not definitively resolve
the issue of the permissibility of even collateral viewpoint discrimination, these
cases are the best place we have to look for the answer. 45 Accordingly, this
section first reviews the justices' brief, explicit references to viewpoint discrimination in Morse, and then examines the majority's maintenance of the
"school is different" baseline before discussing the application of the Morse
principles in the student religious T-shirt context.
a.

DirectDiscussion(Though No Resolution) in Morse

Morse is different from the other student speech cases in that the majority, dissent, and a concurrence each explicitly note the potential implication of
the viewpoint discrimination issue. Yet in all instances, the discussion in the
opinions stops short of resolving the open question.
To begin with, because the majority's holding permits the school to
suppress Frederick's speech, the dissent accuses the majority of doing "serious
violence to the First Amendment in upholding-indeed, lauding-a school's
decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed."' 46
The dissent borrows language from Rosenberger and Good News Club for the
"cardinal First Amendment principle" that "censorship based on the content of
speech, particularly censorship that depends on the viewpoint of the speaker, is
subject to the most rigorous burden of justification.,' 147 The majority's only
response to this accusation is to quote the dissent back at itself, 48 highlighting
the dissent's own willingness to entertain the potential permissibility of limited
viewpoint discrimination-an understandable but insufficient reply to the dissent's allegations. To be clear, the majority neither refutes the dissent's accusation nor concedes the point but justifies its action; it does not comment on the

144

Admittedly, this statement oversimplifies qualified immunity doctrine. For a detailed dis-

cussion on the principle of qualified immunity as it applies to government actors in the context of
public school discipline, see Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2638-43, passim (Breyer, J., concurring).
145
This is not meant to discount the value of appellate or district courts' decisions, but those
decisions do not have nationwide precedential effect. For a discussion of the circuit split on
Hazelwood, including an analysis of how Hazelwood has been applied in cases that reach beyond
the student speech context, see Waldman, supra note 45, passim.
146
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2644, 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's test invites stark
viewpoint discrimination.").
147
Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148
Id. at 2629.
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merits of the viewpoint discrimination charge one way or another. 49 Its closest
statement is the restrictive definition of "plainly offensive" from Fraser,which
in effect brings Fraser more in line with Tinker's first test. This lack of response by the Morse majority creates almost no space for an interpretation other
than perhaps practical speculation that the majority could not reach a consensus
on how to respond to the viewpoint discrimination charge.
Even though the three-justice dissent chastises the majority for engaging
in viewpoint discrimination,1 50 the dissent also suggests at two points that perhaps this "cardinal principle" does or should apply differently in public
schools.' 5' Given its tentative, noncommittal tone in these statements, the dissent seems almost to be wondering aloud about the permissibility of limited
viewpoint discrimination in the school setting and by doing so undercutting the
extent of the constitutional evil of which it accuses the majority.' 52 It is not
clear whether the dissent would conclude that students' constitutionally disruptive religious or non-religious speech could be restricted even if such restriction
amounts to viewpoint discrimination. Furthermore, whether these ideas will
gain enough support to have a majority at some point is unknown; only three
justices signed on to these particular statements in Morse. But for 53now, these
ideas are consistent with the Court's other student free speech cases. 1
Finally, Justice Alito's concurrence noted approvingly that the Court
did not pick up the school's Fraser-and Hazelwood-based argument that it can
149
150
151
152

See generally id.
Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
Id. at 2644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
First, the dissent notes that "[h]owever necessary it may be to modify those principles [of

content and viewpoint neutrality] in the school setting, Tinker affirmed their continuing vitality."
Id. at 2645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This suggests that the dissent assumes Tinker does not negate
the content or viewpoint presumptions outright, but that practical and/or constitutional constraints
may limit the ability to achieve or maintain complete content and viewpoint neutrality in public
schools.
Second, the dissent states, "Given that the relationship between schools and students 'is
custodial and tutelary . . .' it might well be appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in this unique setting. And while conventional speech may be restricted only when
likely to 'incit[e] imminent lawless action' it is possible that our rigid imminence requirement
ought to be relaxed at schools." Id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). (Before this statement, the dissent inserts the qualification that it is assuming that "the school's concededly powerful interest in protecting its students
adequately supports" the restriction at issue. Id. at 2646 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Here, the dissent is echoing the "school is different" sentiment and suggesting without reference to Tinker that
because of the unique context presented by public elementary and secondary schools, not one but
two more aspects of free speech doctrine may deserve modification in public schools. Unfortunately, the dissent's speculation stops here.
153
In his partial concurrence in the judgment and partial dissent, Justice Breyer also accused
the majority of viewpoint discrimination and expressed concern that the majority opinion "could
in fact authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions." Id. at 2639 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). His discussion did not proceed further and also did not address the tentative viewpoint discrimination concessions offered by the dissent.
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define its educational mission broadly and quash speech contrary to its mission.' 54 Justice Alito expressed a concern in the same vein as Justice Brennan's
concern in Hazelwood5 about viewpoint discrimination: that such an argument
"can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways" eventually affecting student
56
speech on political and social issues.1
Thus, Morse is somewhat helpful in that it provides a more direct acknowledgement than the Court's previous student speech cases that student
speech situations may involve viewpoint discrimination. Although Morse does
not resolve this issue, it also did not present particularly good facts for doing so.
b.

School is Different, Redux

Morse also matters because of what it does not change. Specifically,
the majority and dissent both acknowledge the continued viability of the "school
is different" premise that is the starting point in speech and other cases where
the constitutional rules that apply to schools vary from those that apply in nonschool settings.
In fact, the Morse majority took pains to reconfirm the distinctive nature
of the school environment and, correspondingly, the constitutional law principles uniquely applicable in that environment. The majority's unusual litany
notes:
e "Fraser'sholding demonstrates that 'the constitutional rights
of students in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings'" 57 ;
* "[Hazelwood] acknowledged that schools may regulate some
speech 'even though the government could not censor similar
speech outside the school'" 58;
o [S]tudents' rights are limited and "the nature of those rights is
what is appropriate for children in school" 5 9 ;
o "[T]he school setting requires some easing of the restrictions
to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject""; and
154
155
156

157
159

Id. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concurring).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 286 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2637 (Alito, J., concurring).

Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2627.

159
Id. (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
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* "Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere."'61
This recitation serves both to confine Morse's application to the school setting
and also increasingly to separate the legal rules and considerations in cases arising out of schools from those springing from other contexts. Yet, where does
the "school is different" argument stop? Of particular importance to this article,
how does the "school is different" argument apply to the issue of viewpoint discrimination? The opinion of the Court did not address either of those questions.
The dissent agreed with the majority's presumption that public elementary and secondary schools present a special context in which constitutional law
principles often operate differently than in most other contexts, and described
this premise as "uncontroversial.' 6 2 Justice Alito's concurrence, however,
demonstrated much less willingness to employ any "school is different" reasoning although 163
he did not seek to overturn any otherwise valid precedent based on
this concern.

c.

Restricting Other Viewpoints

Because Morse's holding is so specific, it appears to carve out only a
narrow exception to Tinker.' 64 Yet, Morse is not entirely confined to its facts.
As the preceding subsection discussed, the Morse Court reconfirmed the
strength of the "school is different" premise.' 65 Additionally, as this article argues more generally, Morse did not foreclose the possibility that the Court's
student speech cases can be read together to permit some viewpoint discrimination. And, viewing Morse at a significantly more abstract level, Morse reaffirms
the Court's general approach that a school's ability to restrict student speech
depends on the strength of the governmental interest and the character of the
speech itself.
In Morse, the Court took pains to demonstrate the overwhelmingly important nature of the government interest, emphasizing the dangers and frequency of drug use in school-age children, discussing Congress's recognition of
160
161

Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)).
Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995)) (also quoting Bd.

of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829-30 (2002) (quoting the same
language from Vernonia)).
162 Id. at 2643 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163
Justice Alito wrote that "[t]he special characteristic that is relevant in this case" and which
justifies "altering the usual free speech rules in the public schools... is the threat to the physical
safety of students" who are compelled by law to attend a school of their choice. Id. at 2638 (Alito,
J., concurring).
164

Id. at 2629.

165 See supra section III.D.2.b.
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this problem, and noting the authorization of "billions of [federal] dollars to
support state and local drug-prevention programs. ' 66 Correspondingly, what
the majority of the Court took to be Frederick's nonsensical pro-drug speech
was speech with very little, if any, worth-as Professor Taylor characterizes it,
importing a term from a nearby area of First Amendment doctrine, "low-value
speech."1 67 Frederick's speech was not religious speech; it was not political
speech in the conventional sense of the term; it was not even political speech
that also supported illegal activity because it advocated opposition to and disregard for a particular law. By contrast, it is unclear whether the student speech
that is the focus of this article would be permitted under that broad balancing
test. To begin with, the T-shirt speech examined in this article is religious
speech and thus by definition speech with a higher so-called value than Frederick's banner.' 68 Yet, it
also is aggressive and may cause other students substan69
tial personal distress. 1
Furthermore, courts seem less likely to view the governmental interest
in the T-shirt situations to be as compelling as in Morse. It would be difficult to
find that the aggressive religious statements on students' T-shirts create the
same sort of actual physical danger to the overwhelming number of public
school students across the country as illegal drug use does. The physical harm
most likely to result from a controversial T-shirt would be a fight in a common
area of a school such as a hallway, cafeteria, or parking lot, although the media
reports of these situations mainly indicate resulting verbal altercations. 70 Accordingly, the potential for physical harm in the T-shirt situations seems substantially more limited. But, avoiding physical harm is not the only possibly
compelling governmental interest in student speech scenarios. I agree with Professor Taylor that the specific harm in Morse is not that other students will be
motivated by Frederick's banner to start smoking marijuana or to smoke more
of it, but rather that such an expression trivializes the issue of drug use by mak-

166

167
168

Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627-28.
Taylor, supra note 17, at 228.
For example, the Morse dissent expressed concern that the majority's decision could be

used to suppress students' religious speech: "While I find it hard to believe the Court would support punishing Frederick for flying a "WINE SiPS 4 JESUS" banner-which could quite reasonably be construed either as protected religious message or as a pro-alcohol message-the breathtaking sweep of its opinion suggests it would." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2650 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This brief statement certainly does not dictate a clear result in a student religious speech T-shirt
case, although it does recognize that speech can have multiple types of meaning. Importantly,
unlike the religious T-shirt situations, the dissent's hypothetical student speech is not provocative
or aggressive, and thus the interests to be balanced are different.
169
Thus, it is to a degree similar to Fraser's speech, and yet also implicates the concerns of
Tinker's second test. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178-79 (9th Cir.
2006, cert. granted,judgment vacated, case remanded with instructionsto dismiss as moot, 127 S.
Ct. 1484 (2007).
170
See sources cited supra note 4; Harper,445 F.3d at 1171.
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ing it the subject of a joke.17 1 However, the governmental interest may not need
to be as strong as it is presented in the Morse majority in order to prevail under
this more general understanding of Morse.
Thus, this area of law continues to be an intellectual puzzle, and Morse
gives only limited clarity to a doctrine in desperate need of it, solving few of
school districts', administrators', and scholars' questions.
IV. CONCLUSION

Constitutional law governing student speech disputes is becoming notoriously unpredictable. As Justice Thomas stated in his concurrence in Morse, "I
am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in
schools except when they don't-a standard continuously developed through
litigation against local schools and their administrators." 172 In this article, I have
argued for a narrow point of clarity: to the extent a school may restrict student
speech under one of the Court's four student speech cases, it also may engage in
at least the amount of viewpoint discrimination that is necessary to allow these
rules to be fully operational. This conclusion does not create another exception
to Tinker but rather reinforces it, and has the additional benefit of removing one
question from the list of those that an administrator must consider when a student wearing a T-shirt like Harper's, Nixon's, K.D.'s, or Zamecnik's walks into
his or her office.

Taylor, supra note 17, at 230.
Justice Thomas concurred in the opinion of the Court and also wrote separately in Morse:
"Today, the Court creates another exception [to Tinker]. In doing so, we continue to distance
ourselves from Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an explanation of when it operates and
when it does not." Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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